By Priyashree Andley
Amidst ongoing ceasefire violations and militant infiltration into key districts in J&K, it is time to shift focus from boundary of geography to the boundary of time. In irregular wars like cross-border insurgencies, security forces respond to changes in salience of insurgent violence. The aim of terrorists to communalise attacks and right-wing nationalists to use the bait to profess their ideology, complicate counterinsurgency operations exposing inherent divisions in the Jammu region. Doesnt this aggravate state fears of securing its strategic borders?
The main parties suffering in this ocean of fear include the national leadership from India and Pakistan, both armies, and local population on the LoC. So, how to reduce the level of fear and distrust is the main concern today?
Firstly, Indo-Pak relations need to move forward wherein militant violence does not serve the political rationale or serve the interests of material utility maximising rational choice. The top Army commander in India has asserted that more than 30 militants have been killed in the last few months and the success in the operations has been a result of effective counter infiltration grid and integrated intelligence created by intelligence wings in Kashmir. However, the Army chief in Pakistan denies that its army has allowed any infiltration into J&K. So how these militants cross the border is the main reason for mistrust between the two countries.
Secondly, the critical challenge for successful counterinsurgency operations today is to convince conflicting parties to submit to a new political scenario by giving up their individual defences when they are most vulnerable and lack guarantee from their opponents doing the same. It is necessary to understand that the peace process in J&K is based on an incremental approach (step-by-step process: human rights abuse, return of political detainees, reduction in troop deployment). So, national leaders need to discuss at global and regional summits such as UNGA and Commonwealth is what is better for their national and regional security.
They need to understand that short-term peace processes are strategies deployed by militant groups in order to pursue their own goals. It is evident that militant groups have safe havens in parts of Pakistan. For example, the LeT has established long-term contacts with locals within J&K and motivated them for their own ideological goals. India and Pakistan need to work out a strategy to break their linkages with Indian Mujahideen too. This can only be done when both countries cooperate to counter militancy. This will weaken the strong bond between insurgents across the boundary as they will realise that the two countries and their armies are allying together without fear to counter attacks.
Thirdly, several recommendations to encourage cooperation within these boundary regions have to be implemented even though the threat to the infrastructure remains persistent. These include encouraging free movement of people by easing visa regimes and building a well-knit economy by opening transit facilities, encouraging the role of the private sector, joint agricultural research, encouraging free trade zones in border areas, and involving the Diaspora in development process.
Finally, the civilian component of counter-insurgency operations needs to be strengthened. The Village Defence Committees (VDCs) or self-defence militias in J&K are engaged in the defence of their homeland. Initially, Hindus (most targeted by militants) dominated these units. However, the statistics in the past few years have shown that Muslims too have become major targets of terrorists. Even though their request of forming VDCs was accepted, the requests for additional means need to be fulfilled to avoid political groups from provoking communal sentiments. The pay structure of VDCs needs to be restructured to ensure the economic viability of the concept and success of the intended security grid (comprising of BSF, Rashtriya Rifles, CRPF, VDCs). If the recruitment drive is dominated by political parties, it is likely to convert the VDC into an armed political force contradicting the concept of self-defence. The state’s willingness to strengthen these units needs to move beyond mere training to use weapons but providing more incentives regarding education and health facilities for their family. Economic and moral support from the state is a necessary pre-condition to continue successful implementation of this civilian component of counterinsurgency operations.
In conclusion, it is evident that the ongoing dispute across borders is a clear example of how borders are the cause of constant violence, military conflicts and lack of development. What kind of boundary will resolve these differences and assure national sovereignty? It is time to learn from the past to ensure better security of boundary lines today. It is difficult to reduce the trust deficit between the two countries but through more joint national political and defence level meetings this will surely pave the way for fearless counter militancy operations and lesser ceasefire violations.
An independent analyst and focuses on International Relations, Foreign Policy and Current Affairs. She has several years of experience working in both the public and private sector. Her research has taken her across India with publications appearing in national as well as international media. Priyashree is a Felix Scholar from SOAS, London and has degrees from JNU and St. Stephens College, Delhi.