Through the Retrospective Lens: India?s Foreign Policy

By Michelle Cherian

India’s Foreign Policy has always been the subject of debate, not only among the policymakers, who debate to formulate the foreign policy but also among its own mango men and the world abroad who debate on the very existential status of India’s foreign policy. Why this debate, one might ask, a question which can be answered quite truthfully as something which India has brought on itself because of its conscious and sincere efforts.

Before this begins to read like a one-sided sentiment essay, let’s get right down to facts, for which is required a quick revisit into Indian history, to our pre-independent era. India, under colonial rule, had very little to do with other countries in terms of trade, military aid, economic ties etc. as it had been converted, very successfully at that,  by the British into a raw material provider and ready market for its own goods. So apart from its colonial ruler, India had negligible ties with the rest of the world and the ties that it did establish benefited only the British, with India left in the miserable state of gravelling for scraps. Post- independence, India was faced with a whole new scenario; above all, it had to fend for itself. The newly independent nation was left impoverished, economically and spiritually, and a rebuilding process was in order.

India’s primary concern after independence was to ensure national security and it found itself alone in this struggle because of the policy of Non-Alignment it adopted, so as to keep at bay the pressure of joining the two major power blocs during the cold war and to retain its singular status. It unwittingly invited American ire as it chose not to choose between the USA and USSR, while maintaining closer strategic ties with the latter. Then came the nuclear tests of 1974, which were openly condemned by the US and they huffed, and puffed and tried to blow the Indian house down  (put up sanctions against India, banning all kind of trade with it); however, since no regulations were flouted, the sanctions had to be lifted. 1991 and the phase after, when India shed its closed- economy status for good ( largely because USA cut off food supplies and demanded liberalisation), its growth took a upward trend, rarely taking the opposite, and USA realised that try as they might, India cannot be ignored. Attempts were made to strengthen the mutual strategic relationship existing between the two largest democracies and all seemed hunky-dory, but for the Khobragade issue and its concomitant tensions which exposed the fault lines in their relationship.

USSR has remained our former ally, helping us through thick and thin (more thick than thin, actually) during 1945-1991, supplying us with arms and ammunition as well as maintaining strong diplomatic nexus with us. During the 1962 Sino-Indian war, India was in a spot of sorts because USSR took a neutral stance siding neither with its Chinese “brothers” nor with its Indian “friends”. During the Indo-Pak wars, however, Russian aid was strong and steady in its usual form. Another reason that could be cited for India’s liberalisation (it’s a good thing, of course) was the disintegration of USSR in 1991, when India had to revise its foreign policy and look for different allies in the all-new unipolar world.

Let’s come closer home, to the subcontinent. Not a pleasant situation, no surprise there. Dark clouds loom over our relationship with both China and Pakistan, and make no attempt to disperse. The sub-continent, as we know it now, was the outcome of wars, contempt and rivalry. The Indian-Chinese border clash in 1962 arose out of Chinese unwillingness to accept the Imperialist-decided lines of divide, and they succeeded in gaining control over Aksai Chin while the status Arunachal Pradesh remaining a contentious issue till date. Moreover, Dalai Lama’s flight to India, aroused Chinese suspicions, as they felt India was interfering with Tibetan politics, a country which they deemed to be under their control. The Partition of 1946 and the Indo-Pak wars thereafter festered wounds which don’t seem ready to heal any time soon. We have had a variety of issues to deal with when Pakistan comes in question, the most significant among them being territory disputes, especially with regard to Kashmir. What is equally disturbing, if not more, is that China and Pakistan are close strategic partners and if efforts are not made to broker peace with these nations, an alliance between the two could mean lesser options available for India.

India has a panoply of economic, political and strategic investments in both Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, therefore it has to contribute in eradicating the terrorist outfits in the two countries (most of which has already been done by Sri Lankan troops wiping out LTTE, with India’s stand on the issue still being unclear), instead of leaving its national security to chance. The National Security advisor, M.K.Narayan, feels that Obama has “been barking up the wrong tree” as his administration has linked the Kashmir dispute to the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even, Foreign Policy in February 2009 also critiqued Obama’s approach to South Asia, saying that “India can be a part of the solution rather than part of the problem” in South Asia.

Why exactly is a country, viewed not so long ago as a counterweight to China and force to reckon with, gradually losing its significance in the global scene? Let’s chalk one up for our foreign policy.

Former Foreign Secretary, Lalit Mansingh claims, and rightly so, “our foreign policy is one of ‘Jugaad’, improvisation literally; we cross the bridge only when we come to it.” We were very satisfied with our ‘hindi chini bhai bhai’ relations, when suddenly all hell broke loose and India and China could no longer be seen as friends, let alone brothers. Our critical error was not to anticipate such a situation. Again, we were comfortable with USSR being our strongest ally, never anticipating for a moment the discontent brewing in the Russian peoples, which led to its fragmentation, leaving India directionless before it realised it had to forge ties with other countries to surge ahead.

Moreover, our policy of Jugaad, prevents us from formulating possible long-term foreign policies. This is also owing to the fact that there aren’t any rules, any principles to govern the IFS officers who constitute the prime body in the framing of our foreign policy. Moreover, compared to China’s 4000 and USA’s 20000, our diplomatic strength accounts for only 800, which means there would be overlapping of portfolios and less time to dwell on long-term strategies.

Another problem our foreign policy is alleged of having is its quality of being “meek” or if not that then, “indecisive”. We have been labelled time and again, “a soft power”, with regard to foreign policy. Devyani Khobgrade’s case is a shining example. She was charged with visa fraud and ill-treatment of her domestic help, but the procedure of investigation involved a strip-search, swabbing, repeated hand-cuffing, and a deep sense of humiliation for the young diplomat and India alike. India retaliated by lifting security personnel benefits of the US diplomats in India and its initial loud clamour against the Khobragade’s mistreatment was drowned by diplomatic talks between the two nations. The very fact that China could stray “accidently” into indian territory, by a good 19kms beyond the McMohan Line, with the Indian political elite doing nothing more than talks and signing treaties, is evidence enough of our softness.

Indecisive too, because we never take a stand, and when we do, we fear that we might be called controversial. India voted against Sri Lanka in the UNHCR meeting convened in 2011 and 2012, because of severe human rights violations in our small but turbulent neighbour. But, 2013 saw India donning the hat of neutrality yet again, with its stand not being clear as to whether it supported the Sri Lankan Government or the Tamils. Other than condemning USA’s decision, and that too discreetly, of moving out its troops from Afghanistan, as well as perhaps having training sessions for the Afghan forces which too have not been up-to-the-mark, we have done and are doing virtually nothing to preserve our peace. Will we cross the bridge when we come to it?

Let’s not ignore the good though. Casting aside the NAM was a smart move because it is an impractical theory in modern times. India needs to have multi-faceted foreign ties to move ahead, the truth of which it has already witnessed post liberalisation. Moreover, it is commendable that India has not severed trade ties with several countries with which it has geo-political and other tensions. We have also ranked hierarchically countries in the order of their importance for us, another brilliant stratagem, which will help us to link ourselves and establish mutual ties with a few chosen and reliable allies.

All is required of us now is to take a more pro-active role within our sub-continent. The world respects boldness and we must take note of that. If India is bold enough to protect its own interests, it will be difficult task to not take its sovereign status for granted. Negotiations are indispensable, but how to turn negotiations in our favour, is an art that is yet to be mastered.

Again quoting Lalit Mansingh seems apt here, “China is represented by its Dragon, USA by its bald eagle, Russia by its bear, but what about India? Well, India is a Tusker Elephant, huge and unwieldy, calm and often unaware of the direction in which it is headed. But, it is knows its strength, knows what it wants and nothing should risk coming in its way.”

The author is is currently pursuing Economics (first year bachelors program) at St. Stephens College, Delhi. She is passionate about singing, reading and writing. She has remained an integral part of her school editorial team and is an aspiring writor-editor in college too. Her greatest strength is that she believes in herself and that belief gets reflected as conviction towards her work. She wishes to pursue Economics as her field of study by specialising in the branch called Developmental Economics.