Amnesty report helps dispel mirage of democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan

As a new report from Amnesty International has laid out in harrowing detail, Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Region is abandoning pretenses of democratic openness and sliding towards hard-nosed authoritarian rule under the rule of the Barzani and Talabani clans and their respective political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Amnesty’s report, which focuses on the fate of a number of Duhok-based journalists and activists caught up in the crackdown that followed last years’ protests over corruption and unpaid state salaries, dissects how the security services and courts of Iraqi Kurdistan have manipulated vague “national security” laws to conduct arbitrary arrests, keep detainees incommunicado for months on end, and extract forced confessions used by the courts to sentence members of civil society for supposed crimes like defamation and misusing electronic equipment.

The Kurdistan regional government’s goal seems straightforward enough: silence dissent and dissuade citizens from questioning the actions of the territory’s ruling families, most especially the “sacred” Barzanis. As the myth of a stable, democratic Iraqi Kurdistan fades away, both Iraqi citizens and Iraq’s international partners are coming to realize the supposed distinction between the region and the rest of the country is becoming ever less relevant.

A scarcely independent judiciary

If Amnesty, press freedom groups such as the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), and Iraq’s partners in the European Union hoped that increased international attention would push officials in Iraqi Kurdistan to change course, the regional appellate court in Erbil dispelled those hopes on June 27^th when it upheld the six-year jail sentences of five activists and journalists convicted of “endangering the national security of the Kurdistan Region.”

While the European Union’s delegation to Iraq has repeatedly insisted that “basic fair trial standards have not been respected” and alludes to “political pressure around the cases,” the CPJ has been more direct in decrying “a new low for press freedom in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Per the CPJ, a thoroughly unconvincing raft of “evidence” presented by Kurdish prosecutors against the five defendants from Duhok, largely centering on the fact they had been in contact with Western diplomats and non-governmental organizations, nonetheless resulted in guilty verdicts. To explain that outcome, the group points to complaints from the defendants’ families that prime minister Masrour Barzani meddled with the proceedings by publicly labelling the accused individuals as spies in the days before the proceedings.

The blatancy of the collusion between Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and legal institutions in jailing the Duhok five has dispelled notions that the region’s legal system is somehow more independent or transparent than courts in other parts of Iraq. As lawyers and activists in Baghdad know well, Iraqi law only applies to the “weakest” members of society. When faced with legal trouble, powerful or well-connected actors are able to secure favorable verdicts by calling in favors, threatening judges, or simply resorting to old-fashioned bribery.

The cost of corruption

For at least some Iraqi judges, this system has turned out to be extremely lucrative. As part of an ongoing crackdown on corrupt officials, Iraq’s Integrity Commission jailed retired judge Jafar al-Khazraji last month after discovering $17 million in “illegal” undeclared assets under his wife’s name. Before retiring, al-Khazraji had notably ruled on the expropriation case surrounding the Iraqi telecoms operator Korek, a legal saga that has tarnished Iraq’s reputation as a market fit for foreign investment. The Integrity Commission’s investigations into al-Khazraji and dozens of other officials represent the most significant moves against corruption in Iraq in years, with recent attacks targeting anticorruption officials speaking to their impact.

The Korek case is in many ways demonstrative of how political power and legal processes overlap in Iraq. After French telecoms giant Orange and Kuwaiti logistics company Agility formed a joint venture in 2011 to take on a 44% stake in Korek in exchange for over $800 million in investment, Iraq’s Communications and Media Commission (CMC) unceremoniously annulled the companies’ stake in the Iraqi operator without returning any of their capital.

Control of the company, and all of the financial assets Orange and Agility had contributed to it, reverted to its previous owner – Sirwan Barzani, who happens to be a cousin of PM Masrour Barzani and a powerful figure in his own right, serving as the leader of Iraqi Kurdistan’s peshmerga forces. Ignoring revelations that members of the CMC allegedly enjoyed the use of UK properties owned by figures connected to Korek, legal proceedings in Iraq and before the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have thus far failed to provide legal recourse to either Orange or Agility.

Fleeting prospects for change

Though still ongoing, the case (and the prosecution of a judge connected to it) illustrates how political influence and graft in the Iraqi legal system threatens foreign and domestic plaintiffs and defendants alike. It also demonstrates how much sway the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan hold over the institutions of the central government in Baghdad, where the Barzani-controlled KDP and the Talabani-led PUK are kingmakers in the country’s fractious national politics.

Alongside the ruling parties of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Iran-backed Hashed al-Shaabi or “popular mobilization forces” are also emerging as a driving force in Iraqi politics, enjoying the legal impunity that comes with power in Iraq. Just a few weeks ago, the Iraqi government was forced to release Hashed al-Shaabi commander Qassem Musleh after judges found “insufficient evidence” to support charges Musleh had Iraqi activist Ihab al-Wazni murdered in Karbala in southern Iraq.

Those realities make it unlikely parliamentary elections later this year will bring greater transparency, despite massive protests over the past two years and promises from prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi that those responsible for murdering activists would be prosecuted. The anticorruption campaigns launched by al-Kadhimi and Iraq’s president, former Kurdistan PM and longtime PUK member Barham Salih, have nonetheless demonstrated promise in holding corrupt officials accountable, but unless they are able to reach the heart of Iraq’s power structures, Iraqi civil society will consider those efforts yet more window dressing on a hopelessly unaccountable system.

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