From the island of Hawaii to the atoll of Diego Garcia, there extends a geostrategic region that US now calls the Indo-Pacific. This is a region that the US considers a part of its grand strategy to revive its global position which is being challenged by China. US is taking an expansive stance on its support for the Indo-Pacific strategy from promoting freedom of navigation to fostering democratic institutions in the region. The decision to develop a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy has been a reaction to the realisation that American influence is seriously threatened by Chinas enhanced military capability and its deep pockets for the Belt and Road Initiative.
The US has played an indispensable role in defining geography post-World War II via foreign policy, military, and public opinion. Geopolitical terms such as South Asia gained currency in the US foreign policy world in 1960s and 70s as an academic exercise. Afghanistan and Pakistan were the axis mundi of USAs South Asia strategy, where money and expertise have been invested to leave a lasting influence over the region. The Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to do the same, but on a much grander scale, and to also contain Chinas influence. It wouldnt be an understatement to say that the US hasnt faced such a threat on multiple fronts since World War II.
But the question that remains unanswered is where does the axis mundi of the Indo-Pacific strategy lie?
Currently, the US has proposed two sets of competing definitions for the Indo-Pacific: first that prioritises South China Sea as the axis mundi, and the other that is focused on Indian Oceans critical role in the strategy. These are the two geographic regions that US considers central to its Indo-Pacific strategy. One of the proposed actions under this strategy is to establish a viable military alliance to deter Chinas rise despite grave challenges. A close analysis of the rhetoric in support of Indo-Pacific strategy reveals that US has been singularly focused on South China Sea, where it is directly threatened by China.
The American Indo-Pacific strategy is fastidiously trying to establish a friendly military alliance by promoting the Quadrilateral alliance. Experts have called the Quadrilateral alliance the NATO of Asia overstating the status of Quadrilateral alliance at the moment.
Alfred Mahan, the famous nineteenth century US Naval historian, considered geography crucial to projecting power in the Pacific region. Mahans assessment was based on the limitations of USAs ability to support its allies in Asia due to its physically distance from Asia. Mahans influence on American strategy in Asia and Pacific Ocean region is visible in the construction of a series of military bases across the Pacific Ocean region. But Chinas rise undermines this strategy, especially from a geographical standpoint. Japan has always been the ideal American ally for military deterrence and balancing power in Asia. Containing China militarily would take more than a Japan centric strategy because Chinas vast geography poses a major challenge to alliance formation in the region. This problem is compounded by the fact that China is spending billions of dollars to spread its influence across Asia. In a such a scenario, the Quad has emerged as one of the most viable option to forge a deterrence strategy against China.
Despite the initial traction, the Quadrilateral alliance seems to be unwilling to come together as a coherent geostrategic alliance to support USAs grand strategy goals. Both India and Australia have their concerns about unconditional support for USAs strategy. Australia has already pulled out once from the Quadrilateral alliance.
The case of India is no less messy. The Indo-Pacific Command website portrays the transition point between US Fifth Fleet and the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. But for India, the Indian Ocean territory extends beyond this point Diego Garcia and this transition point is critical to Indias naval strategy. Indias geopolitical and economic interest in the Western side of the Indian Ocean have a troubling relationship with the American Indo-Pacific strategy. India has requested greater cooperation between US Fifth Fleet and the Indian Navy, and this is particularly difficult because of the way in which US military commands are currently structured.
The call to redesign the command structures has been growing louder in Washington, DC, especially the design of Fifth Fleet. Some have even proposed disbanding or relocating the Fifth Fleet altogether, an exercise which would be arduous given its crucial role in the Middle East. But there could be some restructuring to address Indias concerns, and which could help bring the Quad alliance closer. India now has a defence attaché at the US command in Bahrain.
Despite the overstated conflict of interest between ASEAN and the Quad alliance, the actual conflict over who gets to spread its influence in the region wouldnt be of much significance. A recent study on the perceptions about Quad in ASEAN region concluded that most ASEAN nations consider Quad to be a positive development. They are more concerned about the internal conflict in the Quad alliance itself. I would argue that these nations are reading into the fact that the Quad nations cant agree about the geography and purpose of this alliance. ASEAN nations concern is confirmed by the changing nature of Quad dialogue and the fact that Australia was missing from the Quad meeting at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires.
The Trump administrations Indo-Pacific strategy has opened the dialogue about future of security in Asia on multiple fronts with multiple allies at the same time and has created much confusion. Even if there was to emerge a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy, it would need to have a comprehensive plan for the Indian Ocean region. The renaming of Pacific Command and renewed interest in the region has brought public attention to South China Sea issue, but without an Indian Ocean strategy, the Indo-Pacific will continue to suffer from the geography problem, leaving India and others on the margins.
The Trump administrations Indo-Pacific strategy has opened the dialogue about future of security in Asia on multiple fronts with multiple allies at the same time and has created much confusion. Even if there was to emerge a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy, it would need to have a comprehensive plan for the Indian Ocean region. The renaming of Pacific Command and renewed interest in the region has brought public attention to South China Sea issue, but without an Indian Ocean strategy, the Indo-Pacific will continue to suffer from the geography problem, leaving India and others on the margins.
Aadil Brar is a freelance journalist and a National Geographic Young Explorer fellow. He is currently working as a Lead Analyst at the G20 Research Group, Munk School of Global Affairs (University of Toronto).