By Zainab Lokhandwala
Ethics of Terrorism:
Before we begin to look at this section, it is important first to understand the very basis of the ethics of any form of combat. For those of us who believe that any form of violence is reprehensible and unjustifiable whatsoever, they need not read further by laboriously delving into the law of war, however, because violence in some form or another has always managed to be a part of human society, a utopia without violence is not as has never been possible to conceive in the world we live, thus as for the rest of us, we can readily take the liberty of going further.
The Geneva Convention on the Law of War (1949) lays down the humanitarian treatment to be met out by countries during a war. The term ‘war’ in the 20th century and earlier has been understood as action restricted to the battlefield wherein only the armed forces were involved in the actual conflict. Civilians were never involved in the actual contest of killing or being killed. The term should not be confused with ‘sacking of a city’ or ‘the victor’s loot’ where civilians, in fact, would be involved. However, these were the consequences of war; it was only after the armed forces of one side were totally vanquished that a city was sacked and the victor got his loot. This, however, changed after World War I wherein, for the first time, aircrafts, were deployed on a large-scale. As a result, civilians (also referred to as non-combatants or innocents) got involved in the fighting.
What the law of war states is that the killing of civilians is illegal. Multifarious rules and technical tenets base their authority on this principle: that innocents should not die in a war. A systematic attack on innocent civilians would constitute a war-crime punishable under the Charter of the International Criminal Court. Thus, it is the killing of innocent victims and risking their lives that has governed the very basis of international law of war. And hence, when we speak of the ethics of terrorism we are referring to the act by which innocents die; that is what makes an act terror illegitimate. Risking of the lives of innocents is the key to understanding what violence is legitimate and what is not.
Keeping this in mind, some of us may argue that the legitimacy of violence is not governed by the above-stated factor but by just cause or intent; which means that if one’s intentions are moral or noble the act of violence can be considered legitimate. Well, those of us who think that way may just fetch a job as spokesperson of US Foreign Policy in Washington! This is because the US has desperately tried to drive home this rhetoric in order to legitimize its own violence and justify its own wars. After the 9/11, the Bush administration argued that certain norms did not apply to US conduct because the US faced a situation of exceptional insecurity. This argument was underpinned first by US’ claim that it was in a state of armed conflict or ‘at war’ with a ‘new kind of enemy’.
Looking into Bush’s comment, we see that the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ is different in many ways from the conventional wars fought in the past. Here is how:
One, previous US governments tended to see the Al Qaeda threat through the peacetime law enforcement lens rather than an armed conflict. The Clinton administration did spend time in response to Al Qaeda attacks, however, these actions were only seen as a part of a policy that would ‘counter’ terrorism rather than ‘wage war’ on it. In the past countries have carried out attacks on non-state perpetrators, yet they never declared war on them; as in the case of the United Kingdom, which was never ‘at war’ with the Irish Republican Army, despite its insistence to call IRA detainees ‘POWs’ (prisoners of war). The post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan was the first conflict that recognized non-state actors as parties to the war. It broke the general routine of a non-international conflict being generally one restricted to a particular region or territory. Simply put, the US saw the fight against non-state terrorism in terms of a war which had not happened in the past.
Second, the US response to 9/11 was understood as being exceptional to the extent it was seen as ‘exempting’ itself from the normative regimes of the existing liberal order- institutions it had done so much to create. This form of exceptionalism was manifested in the spheres of the law of international armed conflict as well as international humanitarian law. For instance, Article 2 of the Geneva Convention which is the provision regulating detention conditions and procedures for trial of POWs (prisoners of war), is limited only to declared war or armed conflict ‘between two or more of the High Contracting Parties’. The Al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party. Resultantly the treatment of Al Qaeda members is not governed by the bulk of the Geneva Conventions, specifically those provisions concerning POWs.
The idea of an independent sovereign power intervening in the affairs of another state for the greater good is not new. This is in pursuit of a higher humanitarian goal which takes precedence over the generally cherished principle of non-intervention. In theory, this has a semblance to John Locke’s ‘prerogative power’ in a ‘state of emergency’ which is now understood to be the ‘state of exceptionalism’. However, the sovereign can never abandon the law only by virtue of the fact that there exists a state of emergency. An exception derives its virtue from the rule itself; and it is hence imperative upon the sovereign to restore the state of normalcy after the exceptional circumstances have passed. What we saw after 9/11 wasn’t a mere digression from the law but a blatant disregard and rejection of any kind of law being applicable to the US. The Afghan occupation as a response to the 9/11 attacks is not considered a parenthetical event in history and the US rhetoric insisting on it being one, has no legs to stand on.
Does the US have a monopoly over legitimate violence, such that where ever else it comes from it is termed as an act of terrorism? Legitimacy of violence can be based only on international order, which is in turn based on the sovereign equality of member states and hence, action taken on behalf of the common good can only be legitimate if it comes after a process of international public deliberation structured by the procedural norms articulated in the Charter.
Before we conclude this section, it must be said that violence that kills non-combatant innocents is always illegitimate. If just cause or intent can justify the killing of innocents then such action requires a ratification of the international community and not the leave of just one nation.
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